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Abstract 
Within political theory the concept of recognition has been generally drawn upon to develop a 
particular form of ethical theory. The concept has been deployed in debates over culture, 
feminism, multiculturalism, individual and group rights, and as a means of conceptualising 
colonialism. A less dominant contemporary line of inquiry is the use of the concept of 
recognition to think through modes of pre-capitalist and capitalist accumulation.   
Much of the early philosophical radicalism contained within the concept of recognition 
has been lost via its subsumption within liberal political theory. Against such a liberal 
‘flattening-out’ of recognition this article builds an alternative interpretation which focusses 
upon the relationship between recognition and accumulation. This is done by way of examining 
how questions of economic power and accumulation were central G.W.F. Hegel’s theory of 
recognition. 
In this light, this paper develops an understanding of recognition as a ‘hinge concept’ – 
one which links economic relations, the juridical form, moral claims and political struggle. 
This is not to portray recognition in any economically determinist sense. Rather, by focussing 
upon its antagonistic basis, as struggle, a concept of recognition gives us a useful way of 
thinking about both historical and contemporary modes of global capitalist accumulation. 
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Introduction 
The latter years of the 20th century saw the emergence of a number of very interesting 
reinterpretations of G.W.F. Hegel’s moral and political philosophy in which the concept of 
‘recognition’ (Anerkennung) was given pride of place. Scholars such as Ludwig Siep, Gillian 
Rose, Axel Honneth, Robert R. Williams, Charles Taylor and Robert Pippin drew attention to 
the primary role that recognition played within Hegel’s philosophical system. In differing ways 
each developed dynamic interpretations of Hegel’s philosophy, reopened and reenergised by 
the struggles, play and follies of recognition and misrecognition operating on and across a 
variety of differing registers.  
One result of this new line of Hegel-interpretation has been the take-up of a concept of 
recognition as something of a stand-alone theory within political thought more generally. In 
particular the very popular philosophical exchange around the concept of recognition between 
Axel Honneth and Nancy Fraser (Fraser and Honneth 2003) has sparked a small academic 
discourse of recognition theory and its application to identity politics, questions of moral and 
political rights and issues of global justice. While aspects of recognition theory have been 
adopted in interesting ways within feminism and post-colonial studies, perhaps the 
predominant branch has been utilised by liberal political theory with rather less exciting results.  
What we might call ‘liberal recognition theory’1 gives up on much of the dynamism, 
radicalism and philosophical potential that was articulated by earlier Hegel-recognition 
scholarship and instead, what gets presented is generally a reduction of the concept of 
recognition to a set of liberal rights and identity questions. In this discourse, the concept of 
                                                          
1 See for example: McBride, 2013. 
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recognition is ‘flattened-out’, beaten almost lifeless, and becomes merely a functional 
mechanism used to better organise liberal politics. In other words, the concept of recognition 
is reduced to strategy within a language game played by liberal political theorists whose global 
philosophical horizons extend little further than the texts of John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas.  
Alongside liberal recognition theory resides a social-democratic theory developed by 
Nancy Fraser which draws conceptual and political distinctions between claims for economic 
redistribution and a politics of recognition. While her position seeks to integrate these into a 
broader theory of social justice, it relies upon a somewhat over-determined and erroneous 
separation between modes of status subordination and economic subordination. Fraser’s 
account overlooks the historical ways in which a politics of recognition always involves claims 
over economic inequality, injustice and redistribution. To miss this connection is to ignore 
something crucial about the nature of recognition and its connection to any radical, 
transformative political project. 
What this paper seeks to present is an interpretation of the concept of recognition which 
undercuts these versions of liberal and social-democratic recognition theory, and instead draws 
attention to the important role of thinking about recognition in terms of political economy and 
struggles over economic justice. Drawing upon a reading of the concept of recognition in the 
philosophy of Hegel, I will show that there are resources within a theory of recognition which 
point to important questions of international political theory often ignored by liberal political 
theory. In what follows I will develop an understanding of recognition as a ‘hinge concept’ – 
one which links economic relations, the juridical form, moral claims and political struggle. 
This is not to portray recognition in any economically determinist sense. Rather, by focussing 
upon its antagonistic basis, as struggle, a concept of recognition gives us a useful way of 
thinking about both historical and contemporary modes of global capitalist accumulation and 
struggles over economic justice. 
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Lords and Bondsmen Made Free 
Hegel’s most infamous passage on recognition, that which gets all of the attention, that which 
brings Johann Fichte’s concept of recognition into the light, radicalises it, transforms it, is 
presented in the second section of the Phenomenology of Spirit (1807). There are many 
different and varied interpretations of this section, some perhaps more convincing than others. 
What I want to emphasise in this interpretation is the link between political, economic and 
juridical forms that are presented in the relation of Herrschaft and Knechtschaft, sometimes 
translated as the relationship between ‘lord and bondsman’, or between ‘master and slave’. My 
argument is that we need to take seriously Hegel’s presentation of the relation between lord 
and bondsman as a something of a ‘hinge concept’. As a hinge concept he is introducing an 
idea which has trans-historical significance at a very abstract level, but on the other hand, 
contains alternative modes of concrete meaning within differing historical and cultural epochs. 
This hinge concept links the political, juridical, and moral to the economic order.   
For example, we could think of Hegel’s account of the relation between master and 
slave as being situated within the ancient economies Greece and Rome. This makes some sense 
given that the section on stoicism and scepticism follows the section on master and slave. In 
referring to the ancient economy Hegel is presenting a very personal relation of power and 
domination of one body over another. In contemporary language, this is something of a 
‘biopolitical’ relation in which the master controls and regulates not merely the life of another, 
but life in general, the plural, often indeterminate lives of a number of slaves.  
Such an inter-personal, or inter-subjective power relation is a political relationship, it 
is a constitutive part and outcome of a political process of the Greek polity or Roman republic 
in which a sphere of freedom is attached to citizenship and a sphere of unfreedom to slavery – 
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those who are predominantly non-citizens, captured in battle and whose coerced labour 
materially sustains the political relation of the ancient republic.2 In this sense the ancient 
republic is made possible through a form of political exclusion and economic inclusion of 
slaves (as well as of women and foreigners). The labour of the slave opens the political space 
of citizenship, it allows the citizen of the ancient republic the leisure time to actively participate 
in a plural, agonistic political process. Hence the excluded, the written-out, those outside the 
order, are constitutive of its inside, the included, the celebrated.3  
Here the relationship of ancient slavery is a hinge concept which links very clearly the 
interdependent relationship between politics and economic production. Ancient republican 
citizenship, civic participation in public deliberation, policy-making and in judicial decisions 
are reliant upon an economic form of labour and production in which the coercive nature of 
ancient slavery plays an important role. That is, the political realm of the ancient republic 
cannot be disconnected from the economic relation of ancient slavery. This is not to argue a 
dogmatic and defunct position of base-superstructure, but merely to state a rather common 
sense materialist position, that the political constitution cannot be disconnected from the 
economic constitution.  
We can read Hegel’s account of the relation between master and slave as a story which 
emphasises an important linkage in which the ancient political mode of understanding and self-
understanding (i.e. ‘self-consciousness’) is one of freedom of the citizen of the republic set 
openly against the unfreedom of the slave. Self-consciousness thus is shaped by an 
understanding derived from the ancient republican political mode and also from the ancient 
economy which was heavily reliant upon slavery. This form of self-understanding then drew 
upon, or was mediated through, the legal categories of citizenship, slavery, property ownership 
                                                          
2 My account of the ancient economy is a very inexact gloss. For clearer accounts, see generally: Finlay 1999; 
Brunt 1971; Anderson 1996; Forrest 1966; Mann 1986. 
3 On the constitutive role of exclusion generally see: Nancy 2000. 
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(in which the slave is a thing), and a set of normative or moral beliefs governing differing forms 
of inter-personal relationships whereby such legal ‘status’ played a predominant role.  
Such a relation was also ‘international’ or inter-republic if we think then of the 
important role that war played in ancient state-formation and in the deriving of the economic 
resource of slavery. The ancient republic’s economic mode of slave production was reliant 
upon a constant process of international conflict in which enemy non-citizens, via capture in 
war, were drawn in as the included-excluded part of the ancient republic – the non-citizen-
foreigner-barbarian whose labour sustains the ancient republic and who makes a republican 
politics of liberty and agonistic deliberation possible. The ‘struggle for recognition’ contains 
then, from the beginning, an ‘international’ dimension, as one outcome of ancient war was the 
possible humiliation of a formerly free citizen-soldier being captured and then sold into slavery. 
In this sense, the struggle to the death is the choice of a form of honourable death for the 
republic, or the clinging onto life then lived through the unfreedom and domination as a slave. 
This life, a life of labour, of drudgery, is the life that makes the freedom of the other (the slave-
owner, the rival ancient republic or empire) possible. In this respect the concept of recognition 
designates a division of labour in which coerced, economic slave production is linked to the 
free political sphere of the republican form. In this the political and economic (together with 
the juridical and ethical) are co-constitutive, each one is dependent upon the other, freedom 
and unfreedom inter-dependent.  
Thought of in this sense, recognition involves the free mutual recognition between some 
as citizens within the ancient republic, each holding and affirming in each other a shared sense 
of social being – that of having their existence and identity as mediated and realised through 
each other and through their collective political form in the sense celebrated by Aristotle’s 
Politics (350 BCE). That is, recognition between free citizens is an ethical relation whereby 
through the self-identification of self-other as common, some form of ‘good life’ (eudemonia) 
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may be realised. For Hegel, this mode of mutual recognition situated in ancient republics is not 
natural, but historical and political and must be won. Further, it contains within in it a moment 
of exclusion and the refusal to recognise a very large number of human beings who are reduced 
to a level of limited recognition, dominated and forced into servitude. This relation of 
recognition and misrecognition is violent, it involves struggle and war stretching between and 
across communities. 
Recognition as a hinge concept links the polis with the oikos, it links the sphere of free 
political citizenship with the economic sphere of slave labour and accumulation. Hegel’s 
insight is important here, recognition involves deliberation, it is the back and forward of 
argument and ideas, it is a linguistic tension and as such emphasises the agonism of ancient 
republican politics in a way that has been subsequently inherited and celebrated in the 20th 
century political theories of Hannah Arendt and Jürgen Habermas. Yet, Hegel’s concept of 
recognition explicitly links the agonism of the polis to the antagonism of political struggle, 
inter-communal war, open violence, domination and the coercive economic relation of slave 
labour. In both Arendt and Habermas, as in much liberal political theory, this link is generally 
underemphasised or ignored. Hegel, like Niccolò Machiavelli before him, and like Carl Schmitt 
and Walter Benjamin after, was acutely aware of the role of violence in constituting and 
sustaining forms of political community. On this view, there is an uneasy continuum between 
the polite deliberation and disagreement within forums, senates and parliaments, and the 
fighting and killing that brings these into being and sustains them internally against opposition 
and against rival communities and empires.  
This understanding of recognition makes clear the link between free political 
deliberation amongst citizens and a coercive economic mode of production. The political, the 
sphere of freedom (citizenship, deliberation, plurality) is bound to the economic, the sphere of 
unfreedom (slavery, domination). What mediates the two is force, coercion, which at times is 
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open violence and war and which is also the operation of political/economic struggle over 
freedom, over economic justice and the control and distribution of surplus. 
If we were to think of other historical forms of political domination and struggle which 
Hegel’s account touches upon, or could be seen to be drawing upon, then the idea of thinking 
about recognition as a hinge-concept between the political and economic constitutions holds 
further weight. In each, the idea of struggle plays an important role. One might think of the 
relationship between lord and bondsman as describing a set of feudal relations and the struggle 
for recognition being quite openly a conflict over political rights and control of surplus carried 
out between the noble class of the manor and their serfs, bonded peasants and tenant farmers. 
Recognition in this sense might be thought more openly as modes of political and economic 
domination, as class struggle, in the sense expressed by Marx in the opening of the Communist 
Manifesto (1848), and of that described in differing ways by Marxist historians such as Rodney 
Hilton and Robert Brenner. Another way may be to think of recognition in relation to modern 
colonialism and slavery, and in particular, with regard to the Haitian slave revolt and 
constitution of a Haitian republic following the interpretation of Susan Buck-Morss. A third, 
would be to think of recognition of a hinge concept linking the political and economic in 
relation to struggle for recognition taking place via the French Revolution and Terror, as 
celebrated in the interpretation of Hegel offered by Kojève. 
 
Recognition in the Capitalist Economy 
Hegel’s account of the modern market or ‘capitalist’ economy can be found in the Philosophy 
of Right (1820) and primarily in the section on ‘Civil Society’ (die bürgerliche Gesellschaft), 
which sandwiched between the institutions of the Family and the State, make up the concrete 
content of ‘Ethical Life’ (Sittlichkeit) within the modern, Western European world. Hegel’s 
account shows quite a heavy influence of Adam Smith in sketching an account of political 
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economy in which individual property owners operate within a realm of exchange and wage-
labour and whose individual desires and needs are mediated through market mechanisms which 
allow a thin level of universality and which in turn help to influence an infinite set of consumer 
wants and desires (Hegel 1991: §182-7).4  
The relationship between differing consumers and producers mediated by exchange in 
the market is for Hegel a particular historical instantiation of the concept recognition. This 
mode of recognition is however different in form and content to the mode of recognition that 
takes place in the relationship of love in the family, and is different again to the mode of 
recognition that may take place when citizens identify and comprehend their social being in 
and through the political relationship of the state. In this account, there is a clearer distinction, 
a separation between the spheres of family life, the capitalist economy, and the political realm. 
Unlike the ancient economy, in the modern market or capitalist economy the individual, 
existing under conditions of modern freedom, can be both (in differing degrees) a citizen and 
a worker.  
In this respect Hegel’s account describes a (somewhat idealised) economic and political 
situation in Western Europe, in which a degree of basic individual liberty is necessary for wage 
labour and the freedom of exchange within the market. For Hegel, recognition within the 
market economy is two-fold. It involves a degree of recognition of the formal legal personality 
of individuals and property owners who interact and affirm each other through market-based 
exchange (Hegel 1991: §191, 192). Yet, the formality of this market-based interaction means 
                                                          
4 On the influence of classical political economy on Hegel’s thought see more generally: Riedel 1984; Ritter 1982; 
Avineri 1972; Pocock 2003. Hegel echoes a theme about the economic productive and utilitarian nature of 
commercial self-interest that runs from Grotius to Hobbes to Mandeville to Locke and is given its clearest 
expression by Adam Smith. Hegel argues:  
 
In this dependence and reciprocity of work and the satisfaction of needs, subjective selfishness turns into 
a contribution towards the satisfaction of the needs of everyone else. By a dialectical movement, the 
particular is mediated by the universal so that each individual, in earning, producing and enjoying on his 
own account, thereby earns and produces for the enjoyment of others. (Hegel 1991:§ 199) 
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that the degree of freedom and self-other affirmation is limited. Freedom via market-based 
recognition is limited to levels of wealth and resources set against the infinite social creation 
of desires and demands (Hegel 1991: §195). 
Hegel’s consideration of the problems of poverty and alienation is more developed and 
nuanced than that of Adam Smith (and Adam Ferguson) before him and we can interpret the 
concept of recognition as being turned towards a wider consideration of these questions within 
a market or capitalist economy. One consequence of a market-based society of producers and 
consumers whose inter-subjective social relationships are mediated via private property rights, 
contracts and market exchange, and in which labour takes place on the basis of ever-increasing 
division of labour, is the atomisation of society. This involves the tearing up of old social bonds, 
forms of cultural attachment and the destruction of the protective modes of group-identity 
within families. Recognition then is the relationship of alienated individuals acknowledging 
and affirming the aspects of their alienated selves – a formal and limited relation of inter-
subjective affirmation (Hegel, 1991: §238, 241).   
One further consequence of the inequalities of market societies is for Hegel the problem 
of poverty, of which it is worth quoting a few passages: 
Not only arbitrariness, however, but also contingent physical factors and circumstances 
based on external conditions (see § 200) may reduce individuals to poverty. In this 
condition, they are left with the needs of civil society and yet – since society has at the 
same time taken from them the natural means of acquisition (see § 217), and also 
dissolves [aufhebt] the bond of the family in its wider sense as a kinship group (see § 
181) – they are more or less deprived of all the advantages of society, such as the ability 
to acquire skills and education in general, as well as the administration of justice, 
healthcare, and often even the consolation of religion…(Hegel 1991: §241) 
 
The existence of poverty, and the active process of impoverishment of parts of a market 
society stem, for Hegel, from a combination of ‘natural’ inequalities and from inequalities of 
capital (Hegel 1991: §200). As opposed to the ancient economy in which the slave was 
excluded from full recognition of its individuality via open force and coercion, in modern 
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market or capitalist economies individuals are formally recognised as free individuals and 
potential property owners, but are excluded through the actual conditions of material 
inequality. It is an economic relation of impoverishment which denies individuals mutual 
recognition as ‘free’ individuals within market society. On Hegel’s account, one consequence 
of modern impoverishment is the emergence of a class in society, a ‘rabble’ (Pöbel), who feel 
their conditions of social inequality as a ‘wrong’ inflicted upon them. Hegel argues: 
When a large mass of people sinks below the level of a certain standard of living – 
which automatically regulates itself at the level necessary for a member of society in 
question – that feeling of right, integrity [Rechtlichkeit], and honour which comes from 
supporting oneself by one’s own activity and work is lost. This leads to the creation of 
a rabble, which in turn makes it much easier for disproportionate wealth to be 
concentrated in a few hands. (Hegel 1991: §244) 
 
In the Addition to this section, Hegel states:  
Poverty does not reduce people to a rabble; a rabble is created only by the disposition 
associated with poverty, by inward rebellion against the rich, against society, against 
government etc. (Hegel 1991: §244) 
 
In editing the H.B. Nisbet English translation of the Philosophy of Right, Allan Wood 
has attached to this section in the footnotes, material from Hegel’s Lectures of 1819-20. In 
these Hegel states: 
The poor are subject to yet another division, a division of emotion [Gemüt] between 
them and civil society. The poor man feels excluded and mocked by everyone, and this 
necessarily gives rise to an inner indignation. He is conscious of himself as an infinite, 
free being, and thus arises the demand that his external existences should correspond to 
this consciousness. In civil society it is not only natural distress against which the poor 
man has to struggle. The poor man is opposed not only by nature, but also by my will. 
The poor man feels as if he were related to an arbitrary will, to human contingency, and 
in the last analysis what makes him indignant is that he is put into this state of division 
through arbitrary will. Self-consciousness appears driven to the point where it no longer 
has any rights, where freedom has no existence. In this position, where the existence of 
freedom becomes something wholly contingent, inner indignation is necessary. 
Because the individual’s freedom has no existence, the recognition of universal 
freedom disappears. From this condition arises the shamelessness that we find in the 
rabble… 
 
On the one hand, poverty is the ground of the rabble-mentality, the non-recognition of 
right; on the other hand, the rabble disposition also appears where there is wealth. The 
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rich man thinks that he can buy anything, because he knows himself as the power of 
the particularity of self-consciousness. Thus wealth can lead to the same mockery and 
shamelessness that we find in the poor rabble. The disposition of master over the slave 
is the same as that of the slave … these two sides, poverty and wealth, thus constitute 
the corruption of civil society. (Hegel 1991: pp. 453-4) 
 
These passages are quite telling, they lead in differing ways towards Nietzsche’s 
category of ‘ressentiment’, and towards Marx’s notion of the development of the notions of 
‘class consciousness’ and ‘class struggle’. It is in these passages that the importance of thinking 
about ‘recognition’ as a hinge-concept arises quite clearly. It is the conditions of 
impoverishment and the sense of the ‘wrong’ done to the poor which leads to the feeling of 
being not fully recognised by society and of directing anger back against the rich, against 
society, against government. Recognition here refers to a mode of self-reflection, self-
consciousness in which the poor attempt to comprehend the reasons for their impoverishment, 
upon which they come to reflect upon the causes of their inequality. It is the sharp and 
contradictory split between the idea of modern market or capitalist society in which the 
individual is given the ideal of freedom, of autonomy, of liberty, and, the material reality of 
being consistently denied this through economic inequality – of being reduced to some form 
of economic servitude.  
Hegel’s response is closer to Adam Smith than to Marx. It is towards the provision of 
public authorities to attempt to alleviate questions of health, education and poverty (Hegel 1991 
§245). Further, the political realm of the modern state is intended to provide some kind of 
reconciliation to bring all citizens back into the fold, to give them some access to shared mutual 
recognition, universality and common identity. The story of Marx’s critique of this idealisation 
is well-known, as is his turning of the critical analysis of political economy via alienation, 
commodification and impoverishment into a wider societal ‘struggle for recognition’ in which 
wage-labouring slaves (proletariat) attempt to overcome, via political organisation and force, 
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an economic system and class rule within modern capitalism.5 This position puts Marx’s 
account of the master-slave relation closer to the younger Hegel of the Phenomenology of 
Spirit, closer to modern and ancient republican theories of class conflict and revolution of 
Machiavelli and the Gracchi, and closer to the slave uprisings of Spartacus and of Haiti. 
Still, regardless of which direction these set of struggles sail off towards what remains 
clear is the work recognition does as a hinge-concept, linking economic relations to political 
conflict and linking these also to juridical forms and moral conceptions of value, worth, dignity 
and entitlement. Recognition in this sense is not merely the apportionment of rights within a 
liberal market society, it is the active process in which the process of alienation, 
commodification, inequality and class power within modern capitalism leads to the formal 
recognition in political and juridical senses and non-recognition and exclusion of those who 
are impoverished. The moral indignity of this contradictory situation can lead to political anger 
levelled at a regime of masters. It can involve the demand of material equality and the 
reorganisation of politics and economics as something that would guarantee full, mutual 
recognition for all humans. The concept of recognition in the modern world then contains this 
radical and impossible desire. As capitalism spreads historically across states, this desire, and 
the indignation of the impoverished against global inequality, spreads with it. 
 
Recognition Going Global 
On the reading given so far, two forms of freedom are affirmed within a concept of recognition. 
The first is the idea of republican citizenship, that is, the freedom of citizens who are affirmed 
communally as equal members of a political community. This mode of human understanding 
stretches across the ancient world of Greek and Roman republics and is reimagined in 
modernity in a variety of liberal, socialist and social-democratic guises. The second is the 
                                                          
5 See generally: Marx 1994; Marx 1988. 
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modern idea contained with commercial or capitalist societies in which individual freedom is 
expressed via inter-subjective market exchange as the mutual satisfaction of needs.  
Yet within capitalist economies any trend towards the impoverishment of large parts of 
the population and the rise of high levels of economic inequality across societies presents a 
sphere of unfreedom. Poverty and inequality are the economic modes of unfreedom in which 
parts of the population are denied full mutual recognition. In this a class of individuals are 
forced into a life in which they are denied the opportunity for the full realisation of freedom, 
either as agents who participate equally in the political realm, or as agents who realise their 
particular needs and desires via the market. 
In this respect, under modern conditions of capitalism, there sits a contradiction and a 
gap between, the ideal of freedom in both political and economic senses, and, the realities of 
unfreedom occurring as a consequence of impoverishment and inequality. One response to 
rampart inequality is an attitude of indignation, an understanding that the state of affairs is 
wrong. A possible consequence are ongoing struggles for recognition which attempt to negate 
this condition of unfreedom and to make ‘real’ or ‘actual’ whatever is posited as a modern 
‘rational’ ideal of freedom. In response to differing concrete conditions of unfreedom within 
differing regions of global capitalism, these responses and claims for recognition may take 
differing forms – from open violence, revolt, and to non-violent occupation. The contemporary 
forms of such struggles for recognition are plural and perhaps chaotic, they cross differing 
spaces and territories and manifest in differing forms of antagonism and social conflict. 
Contemporary demands of recognition combine claims of identity, political inclusion and 
economic equality. Hence, recognition, as a philosophical and political concept always 
contains within it the demands for economic redistribution and economic justice. 
This dual account helps us to reconsider the relationship between the concept of 
recognition and the international. Such an approach broadens also the ways in which Hegel’s 
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concept of recognition can be seen to be relevant to an understanding of international affairs. 
Within the Philosophy of Right, Hegel uses a political conception of recognition to offer an 
account of inter-state relations in which the focus is upon questions of war and violence and 
the shaping of international legal personality through the acknowledgement of statehood by 
other states.6 On this view the state is a status, it gains the status of international legal 
personality in a manner that bears some similarity to the recognition of citizenship within 
ancient and modern republics (Hegel 1991: §331). In some respects this manner of inter-state 
recognition is merely formal, as a state which has military power and wealth is perhaps less in 
need of acknowledgement than its weaker neighbours. Yet, in other respects the formal non-
recognition of the status of statehood is very significant. The denial of recognition of the 
independence of a political community has played a key role in forms of domination that have 
characterised international relations in modernity.  
In a manner similar to the non-recognition of the individual, the refusal of republican 
equality, and the portrayal of an individual as subservient, non-human or as slave, inter-state 
non-recognition has extended throughout modern international relations and international law 
via the history of colonialism, international hegemony and empire. Mastery and slavery, 
freedom and unfreedom within the international have been shaped by modern theories of race 
and cultural superiority. In the 19th century intellectual figures like Hegel could thus adopt 
something of a hypocritical position in relation to the concept of recognition. On the one hand 
Hegel was a supporter of a modern republican ideal in which all citizens of European states 
should be granted civic and economic freedom and formal equality. On the other hand, Hegel 
stands within a tradition of European thinkers adopting an ‘orientalist’ mind-set who viewed a 
number of peoples around the world as so uncivilised as to not deserve the recognition of 
statehood. Consider Hegel’s comment in the Philosophy of Right:  
                                                          
6 For a more detailed account of this see: Kochi 2009. 
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(R)ecognition requires a guarantee that a state will likewise recognise those other states 
which are supposed to recognise it, i.e. that it will respect their independence; 
accordingly, these other states cannot be indifferent to its internal affairs. – In the case 
of a nomadic people, for example, or any people at a low level of culture, the question 
arises of how far this people can be regarded as a state. (Hegel 1991:§ 331) 
 
There is quite a lot that can be drawn out from this, though here two ideas are perhaps 
most relevant. In one sense, while Hegel’s Eurocentric and somewhat racist comments strike 
the contemporary ear as unfortunate and morally wrong, they do point to something important 
within our understanding of modern international relations and international law. For Hegel, 
the form of republican equality and liberty that comes from mutual recognition is not a given. 
Rather, it is the outcome of very often violent, political struggles for recognition in which the 
status of citizenship and communal/state independence is often won or lost via fighting. The 
idea of the violent struggle for recognition by the slave thus has relevance to understanding the 
sphere of global anti-colonial struggles in the 19th and 20th centuries, a point taken up and 
developed by Frantz Fanon.  
In another sense, the hypocrisy of Hegel’s position can be seen to continue today not 
simply at a level of global racial politics, but in the ideological non-recognition of particular 
states, political formations and forms of life. We can think of how in the 20th and 21st centuries 
the dominant, global hegemonic power, the USA, has refused to recognise the independence 
of a number of political regimes and through both open and covert violence has set out to 
destroy their independence. One example is the USA’s war against Vietnam in 1960’s and 
1970’s. Another is the USA’s war against and occupation of Iraq (2003-) and against the 
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) (2014-). In each of these cases the question of non-
recognition of status is linked to the way in which an international hegemon attempts to assert 
power and control over a global capitalist world system.7 In this respect, violent international 
                                                          
7 On the role of economic, military and political/cultural hegemony within the ‘modern capitalist world system’ 
see: Wallerstein 2011. 
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struggles for recognition and status between political groupings which take place as war, occur 
also as attempts by competing political elites to arrest control over the economic ordering of 
societies, domestically, regionally and internationally. Identity and status recognition claims 
here are deeply linked to attempts to control the process of global capitalist accumulation and 
implement differing ideological visions of economic justice.  
Struggles for recognition within the international, especially in the 20th and 21st 
centuries cannot be divorced from conflicts between rival political groupings over the nature 
of domestic and global questions of economic justice. While commonly these conflicts have 
taken place through the juridical and political frame of statehood, self-determination, national 
liberation and nationalism, these conflicts arise also across juridical and political boundaries. 
Here Hegel’s conception of the indignity of economic alienation and impoverishment under 
the conditions of modern capitalism remain relevant, as are his concerns about the demands of 
the ‘rabble’. 
Hegel’s concept of the ‘rabble’ is interesting, the rabble is not a fully conscious 
economic class which adopts some form of transformative historical and political agency as in 
Marx. Rather, it appears more as a sense of disorganised bursts of outrage and anger against an 
economic and political system which offers the promise of economic freedom and satisfaction 
but grants only impoverishment, the denial of dignity and feeling of indignation. The rabble 
represents the failure of political and economic recognition under modern capitalism. Further, 
the concept of the rabble expresses the contradictory demands of wanting both, full satisfaction 
from an economic system, and the negation of the same economic system. The rabble responds 
to a distinct lack of recognition with its often contradictory demands via chaotic forms of 
protest and riot.  
There is something of a revival of Hegel’s concept of the rabble amongst aspects of 
contemporary ‘post-Marxist’ political theory which celebrate the non-totalising, multiform, 
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chaotic and multipolar sense of this form of political (dis)organisation. One example is Hardt 
and Negri’s concept of the ‘multitude’ which attempts to describe the contemporary forms of 
inoperative spurts of protest, riot and political groupings which came to prominence in North 
America and Western Europe by way of the anti-globalisation protests in the 1990’s.8 
Similarity can be found also within current forms of anti-capitalist protests, either in terms of 
the ‘Occupy’ protests of early 21st century, or in the forms of protest that constituted the ‘Arab 
Spring’ which combined protests against impoverishment with the denouncing of authoritarian 
regimes.  
In this light, we can consider the last decade of the 20th century and the initial decades 
of the 21st to involve a set of diffuse, sporadic and largely uncoordinated (or only thinly 
coordinated) bursts of protest, riot, and revolt popping up across the globe, all of which share 
a number of similar sentiments. Each of these situations can be considered in terms of 
recognition claims which express a feeling of indignation against the injustices of modern 
global capitalism and which demand some form of economic justice. The exact content of what 
this form of ‘economic justice’ might be is in no way uniform or universal. However, 
something that perhaps is shared amongst these contemporary ‘rabbles’ or ‘multitudes’ 
scattered and stretched across the globe, is the feeling of indignation, the feeling of not being 
recognised and not being affirmed by a political and economic system that robs people of their 
dignity through wage-exploitation, alienation and impoverishment. What remains clear in these 
protests, riots and revolts across the globe is that these are struggles for recognition in which 
the demand for economic justice is deeply linked to demands of status and identity. 
 
 
                                                          
8 Hardt and Negri would generally deny this Hegelian aspect of their thought, and instead trace the concept of 
the ‘multitude’ to Machiavelli and Spinoza. See also: Ruda 2013. 
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